Compulsory insurance without paternalism

Utilitas 18 (3):243-263 (2006)
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Abstract

This article examines how a just society must address the needs of its imprudent members. I defend compulsory insurance as an answer to this question. It has been assumed that compulsory insurance can only be justified on paternalistic grounds. I argue that this assumption is incorrect, and defend non-paternalistic compulsory insurance. To display the merits of NPCI, I identify a trilemma that arises for views about how to address the needs of the imprudent, including libertarian and so-called ‘ luck -egalitarian’ views. I then suggest that NPCI enables us to escape the trilemma.

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Citations of this work

Paternalism in public health care.Thomas R. V. Nys - 2008 - Public Health Ethics 1 (1):64-72.
Respectful Paternalism.Viki Møller Lyngby Pedersen - 2021 - Law and Philosophy 40 (4):419-442.
When bad things happen to good people.Jens Damgaard Thaysen & Andreas Albertsen - 2017 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 16 (1):93-112.

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