Abstract

Goethe's theory of colours is here revisited within the context of the question whether ‚alternatives’ to modern natural science are possible. To ensure comparability a rather weak criterion for scientificity is taken as a point of departure : science is systematic knowledge. Goethe's theory of colours is a systématisation of the domain of colour phenomena, including ‚structural laws’ and the principles governing the appearance of colours. The difference between Goethe's science and modern natural science is investigated through a direct confrontation of Goethe's polemics against Newton and Newton's Opticks, In particular the questions are treated, why Goethe's science does not include the idea of an endless progress of knowledge and how intersubjectivity is warranted in a „perceptionscience” like Goethe's. The conclusion of the paper is, that Goethe's science contains a functional equivalent at each point where it deviates from modern natural science. So it is rather a question of social interest whether a science of this type will be developed in areas other than colour phenomena