The Ineffable Case of Expressives

Filozofia Nauki 30 (4):77-99 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Expressive terms (damn, fuck, bastard) are said to convey speakers’ attitudes and feelings. These can be positive or negative, depending on the context. In this paper, I focus on the property of expressives that I take to be of the most importance: descriptive ineffability. Descriptive ineffability is a property of expressive terms for which no suitable descriptive paraphrase can be found that captures the full meaning of the expressive. In the face of arguments that attempt to show either that descriptive terms also carry this feature or that expressives (at least in some instances) can be effable, I defend the idea that descriptive ineffability is unique to expressives. I end the paper by considering what descriptive ineffability can teach us about expressive terms.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,990

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-10-31

Downloads
15 (#948,666)

6 months
8 (#505,340)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Justina Berškytė
University of Manchester

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Ineffability: The very concept.Sebastian Gäb - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (5):1-12.

Add more references