The limits of mercy

Ratio 17 (1):1–11 (2004)
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Abstract

Our characters are formed, at least in part, by forces beyond our control. Should this lead us to mitigate the responsibility of those who turn out badly? Martha Nussbaum argues that we ought to be merciful to wrongdoers on these grounds. Against Nussbaum, I argue that we have important moral reasons to treat people as responsible for character and hence to eschew mercy. Treating someone as responsible is required if we are to treat them as a moral agent, to treat them as having a moral point of view that is worth hearing. However my point is not that there are no reasons for mercy, but simply that there are other reasons, to do with respect, that pull in the opposite direction. The result is not a decision procedure for all cases but a better understanding of the complex moral geography.

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Christopher Bennett
Ryerson University

Citations of this work

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