Lust ( delectatio) und Freude ( _gaudium_) bei Thomas von Aquin

Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch Fur Antike Und Mittelalter 7 (1):1-23 (2002)
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Abstract

Thomas Aquinas’s theory of pleasure and joy has many implications of Plato’s thinking, that pleasure must have a certain measure and different degrees, and especially of Aristotle’s teaching about the relationship between pleasure and affection, pleasure and action. Thomas holds pleasure to be given, when a present good is comprehended as attractive, when a soul turns to it and reaches the point of rest in it. Thomas is convicted, that the delectationes intelligibiles are superior to the delectationes sensibiles by reason of their higher union with the intelligible. Looking back to Aristotle Thomas sees the causae delectationis in operation and in motion. The pleasure of the good person is for Thomas a moral norm of acting: Good is, who has joy to act virtuous. Generally we can speak of a renaissance of pleasure as a category of ethics in the thought of Thomas Aquinas.

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