Do me a favor

Southern Journal of Philosophy 61 (2):297-307 (2023)
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Abstract

Suppose that somebody is asking me kindly to do her a favor. She has no right to it. It is my choice whether or not to respond positively. Hence, she asks me for the favor rather than demand it. On the other hand, it seems that my refusal to do her the favor would be rude, inconsiderate, unkind, and morally wrong. This is why we tend to respond positively to favor asking and feel that we have to apologize if we refuse. In this article, I address this puzzle. I claim that refusing to do a favor is morally wrong precisely because a favor has been asked. The requestee needs me, and her very need calls upon me to reveal my goodness. In a sense, this is the strength of her weakness. I claim that acceding to do a favor is a special kind of imperfect obligation in Kant's and Mill's terminologies. As opposed to their descriptions, this obligation is directed toward a definite person at a prescribed time. It turns out that small favors are of the greatest importance for human activity. We all have our needs. We are social animals, and we are depended on others to fulfill our needs. Agreeing to do a favor is one of the building blocks of our shared social endeavor.

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References found in this work

The Doctrine of Virtue.Immanuel Kant - 1965 - Ethics 75 (2):142-143.
Supererogation. Its Status in Ethical Theory.David Heyd - 1983 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45 (4):671-672.
The Reason-Giving Force of Requests.Peter Https://Orcidorg629X Schaber - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (2):431-442.
How requests (and promises) create obligations.Geoffrey Cupit - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (177):439-455.

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