Abstract

This paper discusses Robert Audi’s argument for the rationality of altruism as it is presented in his Architecture of Reason. The argument departs from the assumption of a close connection between rational intrinsic desires and intrinsic goodness: If an intrinsic desire should be rational, it must be a desire for something intrinsically good. According to Audi’s axiology, qualities of experiences are those entities that can be intrinsically good or bad. If these assumptions hold and if human beings are essentially alike, it seems appropriate to claim that a self-centered desire for something intrinsically good is as rational as an altruistic desire for the very same thing, i.e. a desire for someone else’s experience of this intrinsically good quality. The paper provides a detailed reconstruction of Audi’s argument and continues by scrutinizing four concepts central to it. First, the applied notion of rationality and reasonableness is analyzed. Second, Audi’s conceptualization of altruism with its tight connection to an impersonal understanding of intrinsic desires is discussed. Thirdly, several possible interpretations of the central premise of human similarity are described and compared. Finally, the idea of integration, according to which a reasonable person strives for an adequate balance and responsiveness between her beliefs and her desires, is scrutinized.