Abstract
Buildings are frequently described as ambiguous and, indeed, they often involve the ambivalence associated with ambiguous symbols. In this paper, I develop a theory of architectural ambiguity within the framework of a Goodmanian symbol theory. Based upon Israel Scheffler’s study of verbal and pictorial ambiguity, I present a theory of denotational ambiguity of buildings which distinguishes four types of ambiguity: elementary ambiguity, interpretation-ambiguity, multiple meaning and metaphor, which proves to be a special case of multiple meaning. Denotationally ambiguous buildings are exceptions, because buildings usually exemplify rather than denote. I therefore add a theory of exemplificational ambiguity. The crucial distinction between mere multiple exemplification and genuine exemplificational ambiguity leads to two versions of each of the first three types of ambiguity. The resulting extension of Goodman’s symbol theory is of interest beyond architecture.