Authors
Dan Baras
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Abstract
In this review article I focus on Walter-Sinnott-Armstrong's critique of moral intuitionism. Sinnott-Armstrong argues that recent discoveries by empirical psychologists undermine the plausibility of moral intuitionism. In response, I list a number of potential ways in which moral intuitionists might defend their view.
Keywords Moral Intuitionism  Robert Audi  Walter Sinnott-Armstrong  Moral Realism  Moral Epistemology  Moral Psychology
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