Review - The New Intuitionism [Book Review]

Metapsychology Online Reviews 16 (49) (2012)
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Abstract

In this review article I focus on Walter-Sinnott-Armstrong's critique of moral intuitionism. Sinnott-Armstrong argues that recent discoveries by empirical psychologists undermine the plausibility of moral intuitionism. In response, I list a number of potential ways in which moral intuitionists might defend their view.

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Dan Baras
Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan

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