Probabilities and epistemic pluralism

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (1):31-47 (1998)
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Abstract

A pluralistic scientific method is one that incorporates a variety of points of view in scientific inquiry. This paper investigates one example of pluralistic method: the use of weighted averaging in probability estimation. I consider two methods of weight determination, one based on disjoint evidence possession and the other on track record. I argue that weighted averaging provides a rational procedure for probability estimation under certain conditions. I consider a strategy for calculating ‘mixed weights’ which incorporate mixed information about agent credibility. I address various objections to the weighted averaging technique and conclude that the technique is a promising one in various respects

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Eric Barnes
Southern Methodist University

Citations of this work

Are disagreements honest.Tyler Cowen & Robin Hanson - forthcoming - Journal of Economic Methodology.
Predictivism for pluralists.Eric Christian Barnes - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (3):421-450.
Discussion. How to weight scientists' probabilities is not a big problem: Comment on Barnes.P. E. Meehl - 1999 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (2):283-295.

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