Explains the social theories of contemporary German intellectual Jurgen Habermas.

This paper presents an argument for reconceptualizing (human) intelligence as intellectual virtue, and makes some proposals as to how we would understand intellectual virtue if feminist values were taken into account. Several abilities are identified which are closely connected to one aim that is common to most feminists: the building of communities in which well-being is possible.

The following is a defense of Jurgen Habermas' argumentational consensual procedure against Keith Lehrer and Carl Wagner's weighted averaging consensual procedure (and, I tentatively claim, against any weighted averaging consensual procedure). The argument is twofold: if Lehrer and Wagner intend, implicity, to replace what is for Habermas the metatheoretical stage of a discussion with the aggregation of judgments of respect, then their procedure fails to make use of all available information and the participants are not committed to the weighted average (...) position on these grounds; if, on the other hand, they do not intend to replace metatheoretical discussion by aggregation, then the conditions under which the discussion could conceivably have come to a halt are such as to provide no support for the claim that it is rational to aggregate, rather than to consider the discussion unresolved until more information is available. (shrink)