On the Possibility of Indeterminacy
Dissertation, New York University (
2003)
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Abstract
Intuitively, a question is indeterminate just in case it is unsettled, not merely epistemically, but metaphysically. We ordinarily ascribe indeterminacy by saying that there is no fact of the matter. We say for instance that there is no fact of the matter how many clouds exist. The distribution of water droplets in the sky would appear to settle that there are some clouds, but not how many. ;On the one hand, it seems obvious that certain questions are indeterminate. On the other hand, it seems easy to reduce an arbitrary ascription of indeterminacy to absurdity: Suppose that it is indeterminate---that is, metaphysically unsettled---whether Jud is bald. Because it is true that Jud is bald only if it is metaphysically settled that he is bald, and because it is true that Jud is not bald only if it is metaphysically settled that he is not bald, it is not true that Jud is bald and not true that Jud is not bald. Because Jud is bald only if it is true that he is bald, and because Jud is not bald only if it is true that he is not bald, Jud is not bald and Jud is not not bald. This is a contradiction. Hence, our supposition is false. Moreover, because the issue of whether Jud is bald was chosen arbitrarily, the argument generalizes: indeterminacy is impossible. ;We are faced with a dilemma: take the anti-indeterminacy argument at face value and look for a way to explain away our pro-indeterminacy intuitions, or take our intuitions at face value and look for a way to reject the argument. Many philosophers are inclined toward the latter route, but I want to take the first step toward justifying the former. ;After emphasizing the costs of rejecting the preceding sort of argument, I show how five of the most salient phenomena that give rise to pro-indeterminacy intuitions can be accounted for without postulating genuine indeterminacy. I examine explicitly incomplete definitions, hidden relativity, vagueness, comparatives, and subjunctive conditionals. In each case I suggest a way to account for the phenomenon without postulating indeterminacy