Abstract

Internalism and externalism in ethical theory are two opposing positions concerning the connection between moral obligation and an agent's motivations. Internalism is the view that motivation is a necessary part of moral obligation, and externalism is a denial of internalism. According to externalism, an agent can have a moral obligation to perform a particular action even though the agent lacks a motive for performing that action. The main objective of this dissertation is to focus attention on, and solve, this fundamental disagreement about the role motives play in moral obligations. This dissertation argues that, because of a feature of intentional actions, all external moral theories are false. Consequently, the basis of any adequate moral theory must be internalism. In other words, an agent cannot be morally obligated at a time, t, to perform any action that agent has no motive at t for performing. ;Although the terms "internalism" and "externalism" can be traced to W. D. Falk, the internalist position concerning the connection between obligations and motives has an extensive and impressive history. Falk's own version of internalism is discussed in detail. The more recent internalist theory of Bernard Williams is also examined. These two internal theories, although criticized by externalists, contain the elements for the rejection of all external theories. Additionally, the externalist position is examined by focusing on some specific criticisms of Williams' version of internalism which are supposed to have implications for all other internal moral theories. These criticisms are not successful. Although Williams' internalism is flawed, Williams is correct in pointing out that externalism must be false. David Brink, an externalist, has also provided several arguments for moral realism which include the claim that all moral theorists must reject internalism. This dissertation points out that Brink's argument against internalism is only successful because of a mischaracterization of the internalist position. Once the error in Brink's discussion of internalism is corrected, his rejection of all internal moral theories is unconvincing. Internalism is shown to be not only a plausible but also a necessary component of all moral theories