Calling for Explanation

New York, NY: Oxford University Press (2022)
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Abstract

The idea that there are some facts that call for explanation serves as an unexamined premise in influential arguments for the inexistence of moral or mathematical facts and for the existence of a god and of other universes. This book is the first to offer a comprehensive and critical treatment of this idea. It argues that calling for explanation is a sometimes-misleading figure of speech rather than a fundamental property of facts.

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Dan Baras
Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan

Citations of this work

What Makes Something Surprising?Dan Baras & Oded Na’Aman - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (1):195-215.
Five Kinds of Epistemic Arguments Against Robust Moral Realism.Joshua Schechter - 2023 - In Paul Bloomfield & David Copp (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Moral Realism. Oxford University Press. pp. 345-369.
Methodological reflections on the MOND/dark matter debate.Patrick M. Duerr & William J. Wolf - 2023 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 101 (C):1-23.

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References found in this work

Ethics without principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism.David Enoch - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Theory of knowledge.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1966 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall.
Realism, Mathematics & Modality.Hartry H. Field - 1989 - New York, NY, USA: Blackwell.
A Darwinian dilemma for realist theories of value.Sharon Street - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.

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