Doubts about Projectivism

Philosophy 61 (236):215 - 228 (1986)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

How, in pursuit of ontological neutrality, should one talk about values? I propose to say: there are values. Those three words do nothing to define within what kind of conception of a world values are at home.1 I take it that the ‘realist’ must have more to say about values and their world. I recognize that an ‘anti-realist’ may prefer to talk of value-terms ; I ask him to wait and see whether taking the linguistic turn is the only way to put values in their place.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,779

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Doubts About Projectivism.A. W. Price - 1986 - Philosophy 61 (236):215-228.
Is Technology Value-Neutral?Boaz Miller - 2021 - Science, Technology, and Human Values 46 (1):53-80.
Ontological anti-realism.David J. Chalmers - 2009 - In Ryan Wasserman, David Manley & David Chalmers (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
On Richard Schacht's Nietzsche.John Richardson - 2015 - Journal of Nietzsche Studies 46 (2):198-206.
Why I don't believe in moral values: a comment on Culyer.H. V. McLachlan - 2003 - Journal of Medical Ethics 29 (4):242-242.
The Objectivity of Values.Donald Davidson - 2004 - In Problems of rationality. New York: Oxford University Press.
Against Magnitude Realism.Geoffrey Lee - 2023 - Critica 55 (163):13-44.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-08-10

Downloads
58 (#269,191)

6 months
20 (#173,941)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Anthony Price
Birkbeck College

Citations of this work

Trusting our own minds.Dennis Kalde - 2019 - Dissertation, Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München

Add more citations

References found in this work

Moral realism.Simon Blackburn - 1971 - In John Casey (ed.), Morality and moral reasoning. London,: Methuen.
Introductory essay : Communal agreement and objectivity.Christopher M. Leich & Steven H. Holtzman - 1981 - In Steven H. Holtzman & Christopher M. Leich (eds.), Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule. Boston: Routledge.

Add more references