Unfair to Facts

In John Langshaw Austin (ed.), Philosophical Papers. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press (1961)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

‘Unfair to Facts’ is a follow-up on Ch. 5, addressing objections Peter Strawson raised against Austin’s view of truth as a description of the conditions that must be satisfied if we are to say of a statement that it is true. Austin addresses the objection that his description of these conditions is due to a misunderstanding about the use of ‘fact’, arguing, against Strawson, that facts are not pseudo-entities and that the notion of ‘fitting the facts’ is not a useless notion.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 94,045

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Unfair to facts.J. L. Austin - 1961 - In John Langshaw Austin (ed.), Philosophical Papers. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.
Unfair to Facts”, in his.J. L. Austin - 1961 - In John Langshaw Austin (ed.), Philosophical Papers. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.
Unfair to Facts.J. L. Austin - 2005-01-01 - In José Medina & David Wood (eds.), Truth. Blackwell.
Austin's ‘Philosophical Papers’.Alice Ambrose - 1963 - Philosophy 38 (145):201.
Philosophical Papers.J. O. Urmson & G. J. Warnock (eds.) - 1961 - Clarendon Press.
Philosophical papers.John Langshaw Austin - 1961 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by J. O. Urmson & G. J. Warnock.
Symposium on J. L. Austin. [REVIEW]R. J. B. - 1970 - Review of Metaphysics 23 (4):756-756.

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-10-25

Downloads
0

6 months
0

Historical graph of downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Sense and the identity conception of truth.Steven J. Methven - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):1041-1056.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references