Der „naturalistische Fehlschluß“ als juristische Argumentationsfigur

Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 94 (4):461-476 (2008)
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Abstract

The talk of a naturalistic fallacy has become rather common in recent bioethical debates, especially in the field of jurisprudence. The following article takes a closer look at the term, retracing it to its origin in the moral philosophy of G.E. Moore. The analysis shows that the concept of the naturalistic fallacy is not only philosophically highly controversial. It is also neither used correctly - in its original meaning - in the current debates nor is it very helpful to solve the specific juridical questions in bioethics.

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