The Natural-Artificial Distinction and the Technologization of Sport

Philosophies 5 (4):28 (2020)
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Abstract

The natural-artificial distinction is not only an abstract metaphysical question dedicated to classifying and differentiating between entities and phenomena that occur in nature from man-made objects. The distinction between the natural and the artificial is central to the philosophy of technology and an interesting heuristic to discuss important notions about the growing process of technologization in sport. For example, if one accepts the natural-artificial distinction, one is against any genetic intervention to improve sports performance because one would consider it unnatural. In this article, I present an argument against the natural-artificial distinction and defend the ethical permissibility of the technologization of sport.

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