Abstract

Mark Siderits’s contributions to the study of Indian philosophy have long included rational reconstruction of arguments and positions typical of the Madhyamaka school of Buddhist thought. A widely-known expression of this tradition’s core contention – “the ultimate truth is that there is no ultimate truth” – is widely attributed to Siderits, and my own studies of Madhyamaka have from the outset been influenced by his philosophically sophisticated work. Nonetheless, I have always resisted Siderits’s predilection for characterizing Madhyamaka as exemplifying anti-realism, as well as the notion that this tradition’s concerns are best characterized as semantic. On my reading, the insight aptly expressed by Siderits’s signature formulation is better characterized as transcendental – as identifying, that is, something presupposed by the very fact that pursuit of the Buddhist path is in the first place intelligible. Siderits, then, would dispel his formulation’s air of paradox by taking it to mean, “it is ultimately true that no statement corresponds to the ultimate nature of reality.” I have taken the same statement as aptly expressing the contention, rather, that “it is ultimately true” – that is, practically incontrovertible once it has been clarified, by Madhyamaka critique, what it would mean for anything to be ‘ultimately real’ – “that there are no ultimately real existents.” While these make sense as philosophically distinct emphases, it is reasonable to wonder whether there is any practically significant difference between these ideas. By way of honoring Mark Siderits’s influence on my own understanding, this essay explores the extent and significance of our divergent emphases.