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On Existence, Inconsistency, and Indispensability
Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 22 (1):07-34 (2018)
Abstract
In this paper I sketch some lines of response to Mark Colyvan’s indispensability arguments for the existence of inconsistent objects, being mainly concerned with the indispens ability of inconsistent mathematical entities. My response will draw heavily on Jody Azzouni’s deflationary nominalism.Links
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Citations of this work
On epistemic and ontological interpretations of intuitionistic and paraconsistent paradigms.W. Carnielli & Abilio Rodrigues - forthcoming - Logic Journal of the IGPL.
References found in this work
Science Without Numbers: A Defence of Nominalism.Hartry H. Field - 1980 - Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.
In contradiction: a study of the transconsistent.Graham Priest - 1987 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Epistemology Naturalized.W. V. Quine - 1969 - In Willard van Orman Quine (ed.), Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. Columbia University Press.
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