Oxford, England: Oxford University Press (2001)
Authors |
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Abstract |
This book not only outlines the indispensability argument in considerable detail but also defends it against various challenges.
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Keywords | Mathematics Philosophy |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
Reprint years | 2001, 2003 |
Buy this book | Amazon page |
Call number | QA8.4.C65 2001 |
ISBN(s) | 0195166612 9780195166613 019513754X |
DOI | 10.1093/mind/112.446.331 |
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Citations of this work BETA
Are There Genuine Mathematical Explanations of Physical Phenomena?Alan Baker - 2005 - Mind 114 (454):223-238.
An Inferential Conception of the Application of Mathematics.Otávio Bueno & Mark Colyvan - 2011 - Noûs 45 (2):345-374.
The Explanatory Power of Phase Spaces.Aidan Lyon & Mark Colyvan - 2008 - Philosophia Mathematica 16 (2):227-243.
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