Non-monotonic logic

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2008)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The term "non-monotonic logic" covers a family of formal frameworks devised to capture and represent defeasible inference , i.e., that kind of inference of everyday life in which reasoners draw conclusions tentatively, reserving the right to retract them in the light of further information. Such inferences are called "non-monotonic" because the set of conclusions warranted on the basis of a given knowledge base does not increase (in fact, it can shrink) with the size of the knowledge base itself. This is in contrast to classical (first-order) logic, whose inferences, being deductively valid, can never be "undone" by new information.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 86,507

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
120 (#128,125)

6 months
5 (#192,757)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

G. Aldo Antonelli
University of California, Davis

Citations of this work

Full & Partial Belief.Konstantin Genin - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 437-498.
A Nonmonotonic Sequent Calculus for Inferentialist Expressivists.Ulf Hlobil - 2016 - In Pavel Arazim & Michal Dančák (eds.), The Logica Yearbook 2015. College Publications. pp. 87-105.
The philosophy of computer science.Raymond Turner - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Logic, Reasoning, Argumentation: Insights from the Wild.Frank Zenker - 2018 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 27 (4):421-451.

View all 13 citations / Add more citations