Defeasible Reasoning as a Cognitive Model

In Krister Segerberg (ed.), The Parikh Project. Seven Papers in Honour of Rohit. Uppsala Prints & Preprints in Philosophy (1996)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

One of the most important developments over the last twenty years both in logic and in Artiļ¬cial Intelligence is the emergence of so-called non-monotonic logics. These logics were initially developed by McCarthy [10], McDermott & Doyle [13], and Reiter [17]. Part of the original motivation was to provide a formal framework within which to model cognitive phenomena such as defeasible inference and defeasible knowledge representation, i.e., to provide a formal account of the fact that reasoners can reach conclusions tentatively, reserving the right to retract them in the light of further information.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,322

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
7 (#1,351,854)

6 months
1 (#1,533,009)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

G. Aldo Antonelli
University of California, Davis

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references