Phenomenology and Mathematics in Oscar Becker

Filosofiya-Philosophy 32 (4):412-429 (2023)
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Abstract

According to Becker, the dispute between the intuitionistic (construction as the guarantor of mathematical existence) and the formalistic (non-contradiction as the guarantor of mathematical existence) definition should be resolved in a phenomenological perspective on the problem. The question of the legitimacy of the transfinite should also be resolved in the perspective of a phenomenological constitutive analysis. This analysis provides the key to the problematic of mathematical existence: the result of Becker’s investigations on the logic and ontology of the mathematical is a solution in favour of the “genuine phenomena” of intuitionistic mathematics and the infinite. “Genuine phenomena” are those which turn out to be accessible for constitutive analysis precisely as phenomena of “pure consciousness” and even of the “concrete historical Dasein.” The final solution in favour of the “genuine phenomena” of intuitionistic mathematics and the infinite is motivated by the fact that Hilbert’s formalism does not satisfy the “chief phenomenological principle of demonstrability” (Ausweisbarkeit).

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