Abstract

The contemporary debate on the concept of health is a tug-of-war between naturalists and normativists. Although health can be valued or disvalued, naturalists argue that the concept of health is value-free. In contrast, normativists argue that the concept of health is value-laden. This dissertation examines this controversy focusing on the naturalistic concept of health defended by Christopher Boorse. Boorse claims that health and disease are value-free concepts in the sense that diseased and healthy states can be gleaned from the facts of nature without an appeal to value judgments. ;The dissertation first examines Boorse's critical assessment of both the naturalist and normativist concepts of health that he rejects. Then there is a critical examination of the concept of function, which is crucial to his concept of health. Subsequently, an exegesis of Boorse's concept of health is provided. This is followed by an evaluation of the many replies by his critics and Boorse's rejoinder to them. Finally, a modified version of Boorse's concept of health is proposed taking into account some of the intractable difficulties with his theory. ;There are six main findings regarding Boorse's theory: First, Boorse successfully rejects the main normative concepts of health. Second, he is partially successful against specific naturalistic concepts of health. Third, Boorse's contextualist concept of function is not entirely persuasive. Fourth, Boorse's concept of health is persuasive because he qualifies it to accommodate differences in age, gender, and species type. Fifth, with respect to his critics, Boorse is inconsistent in his reliance on evolution and does not give a proper place to the environment in his account. Sixth, a modified version of Boorse's concept of health, which includes an evolutionary sense of function, homeostasis, and acknowledges environmental factors , is a more appropriate way to understand health. ;This dissertation arrives at three major conclusions: First, Boorse's concept of health is mainly successful in response to the normativists, but he should concede that epistemic norms are part of his concept of health. Second, an evolutionary concept of function is superior to Boorse's part-functionalist account. Third, a prominent place should be given to both homeostasis and environmental factors, along with the factors of age, sex, and species mentioned by Boorse. A modification of Boorse's account reflecting these conclusions will be a more defensible naturalistic concept of health