Comments on “individuating lexical types and
Abstract
In this commentary, I am going to focus on the earlier sections of Lapointe’s paper in which she defends an interpretation of Frege’s account of the individuation of lexical types. According to Lapointe, Frege rejects the view that two signs – concrete particulars – belong to the same lexical type just in case they are tokens of the same orthographic or phonographic type. Instead Frege’s position is that two signs belong to the same lexical type “only if they are recognized as belonging to the same lexical type.” [p. 1] And recognizing that a (currently perceived) sign is of the same lexical type as previous perceived sign requires recognizing (i) that the current sign was produced and deployed with communicative intentions and (ii) that the speaker/ inscriber of the current sign and the speaker/ inscriber of the previous sign have “the same mental state or mental states that are similar in some essential manner.” [p.