Précis of The Matter of Consciousness: From the Knowledge Argument to Russellian Monism

Philosophia 52 (2):203-210 (2024)
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Abstract

In The Matter of Consciousness (TMOC), I defend Frank Jackson’s (1982, 1986, 1995) knowledge argument, which poses a significant challenge to physicalism. I also argue that the knowledge argument leads to Russellian monism.

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Torin Alter
University of Alabama

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References found in this work

Epiphenomenal qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
Naming and Necessity.S. Kripke - 1972 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45 (4):665-666.
Mind and Illusion.Frank Jackson - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 53:251-271.

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