Does synesthesia undermine representationalism?

PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12 (2006)
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Abstract

Does synesthesia undermine representationalism? Gregg Rosenberg (2004) argues that it does. On his view, synesthesia illustrates how phenomenal properties can vary independently of representational properties. So, for example, he argues that sound/color synesthetic experiences show that visual experiences do not always represent spatial properties. I will argue that the representationalist can plausibly answer Rosenberg

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Torin Alter
University of Alabama

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References found in this work

On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Reason, Truth and History.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - Cambridge University Press.
The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.

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