3 Perception and Conception

In Kenneth Westphal (ed.), Pragmatism, Reason, and Norms: A Realistic Assessment. Fordham University Press. pp. 59-88 (2020)
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Citations of this work

Intentionalism defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.
Intentionalism Defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.

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