Bradley’s Argument Against Correspondence

Idealistic Studies 10 (3):232-244 (1980)
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Abstract

Despite periodic references to F. H. Bradley as a dogmatic metaphysician of the worst sort, or an unreformed, conservative, and nonhistorical Hegelian, one of his logical doctrines is now a commonplace: his analysis of the logical form of affirmative universal categorical statements. In “On Denoting” Russell adopted this analysis without discussion, merely noting that it had been “ably argued” by Bradley. Virtually all philosophers since have followed suit. It is now an accepted truth that statements like “All A’s are B” have the logical form.

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