Abstract

Rooted in Aristotelian tradition, Scientific Essentialism is an important metaphysical theory. According to this theory, some properties determine the nature of a physical entity. The proponents of such a view hold that all physical entities have their own essences. Denying the possibility of knowing the essences of the entities, some philosophers have criticized Aristotle essentialism. This criticism came to the peak with the denial of metaphysics in Logical Positivism. Essentialism was developed with a scientific appearance by philosophers such as; Kripke and Putnam. Introducing a new metaphysics, Ellis contributed in revival of essentialism. This metaphysics was enriched with the concept of natural kind, such that the natural kinds and their essential features reached an important place in scientific essentialism. Introducing scientific essentialism and natural kind thesis, this paper tries to show the capabilities of the philosopher’s views to defend the essentialism. The achievements of scientific essentialism are reflected in the topics such as; possible worlds, distinction between analysis and semantics of dispositional properties, the problem of referring to these properties, and the problem that why it is not possible to reduce the structural universal to nonstructural universal.