Game theory can build higher mental processes from lower ones

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):16-18 (2007)
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Abstract

The question of reductionism is an obstacle to unification. Many behavioral scientists who study the more complex or higher mental functions avoid regarding them as selected by motivation. Game-theoretic models in which complex processes grow from the strategic interaction of elementary reward-seeking processes can overcome the mechanical feel of earlier reward-based models. Three examples are briefly described. (Published Online April 27 2007).

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Rational Preferences.Martin Hollis - 1983 - Philosophical Forum 14 (3):246.
Walden Two. [REVIEW]H. A. L. & B. F. Skinner - 1949 - Journal of Philosophy 46 (20):654.

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