Esoteric Reliabilism

Episteme 18 (4):603-623 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Survey data suggest that many philosophers arereliabilists, in believing that beliefs are justified iff produced by a reliable process. This is bad news if reliabilism is true. Empirical results suggest that a commitment to reliable belief-formation leads to overconfident second-guessing of reliable heuristics. Hence, a widespread belief in reliabilism is likely to be epistemically detrimental by the reliabilist's own standard. The solution is a form of two-level epistemic consequentialism, where an esoteric commitment to reliabilism will be appropriate for an enlightened few, while a form of epistemic fetishism – on which some heuristics are treated as fundamental epistemic norms – is appropriate for the rest of us.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,139

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Is reliabilism a form of consequentialism?Jeffrey Dunn & Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2):183-194.
Process reliabilism's troubles with defeat.Bob Beddor - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (259):145-159.
Damming the Swamping Problem, Reliably.Jared Bates - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (1):103-116.
How to Be A Reliabilist.Christoph Kelp - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2):346-374.
Causal Tracking Reliabilism and the Lottery Problem.Mark Mcevoy - 2012 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 86 (1):73-92.
How to Be a Reliabilist.Jonathan Kvanvig - 1986 - American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (2):189 - 198.
Three kinds of reliabilism.Frank Hofmann - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):59 - 80.
The diagonal and the demon.Juan Comesaña - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (3):249 - 266.
Consciousness, experience, and justification.Harold Langsam - 2002 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):1-28.
Consciousness, Experience, and Justification.Harold Langsam - 2002 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):1-28.
Reliabilism without Epistemic Consequentialism.Kurt L. Sylvan - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (3):525-555.
Reliabilism and the Suspension of Belief.Weng Hong Tang - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):362-377.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-10-31

Downloads
17 (#795,850)

6 months
2 (#1,015,942)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

What do philosophers believe?David Bourget & David J. Chalmers - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):465-500.
A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition.John Rawls - 1999 - Harvard University Press.
Knowledge in a social world.Alvin I. Goldman - 1991 - New York: Oxford University Press.

View all 24 references / Add more references