Abstract

One of the fundamental questions about Moore's ethical intuitionism is that what role the intuition plays in the formation of ethical concepts and judgments. In this paper, I have scrutinized Moore's answer by an analytic method, and by differentiating the two meanings of “Intuition” in his views, i.e. the intuition of the property of “Goodness”-which I have called “Intuition ”- and the intuition of the propositions containing the predicate “Good”-which I have called “Intuition ”-I have reached these results: 1) Intuition influences on the formation of ethical concepts by the concept of “Goodness” as the cause of the ethical concepts; 2) Intuition influences on the formation of ethical judgments by the simple concept of “Goodness”; 3) Intuition influences on the formation of the complex ethical concepts by the simple predicate “Good”; 4) Intuition, by virtue of the self-evidence and necessary truth of the propositions containing the predicate “Good”, influences on the formation of other propositions or judgments.