Abstract

One of the most fundamental questions about G. E. Moore's ethical intuitionism relates to its scope. Does Moore's ethical intuitionism only relate to the value - ethical terms and the ethical judgments or propositions containing them, or beside those terms and judgments or propositions, it relate to the obligatory ethical terms and the ethical judgments or propositions containing them? In this paper, we will try to show, by an analytic - critical method, that contrary to some of Moore's interpreters/critics, the scope of Moore's ethical intuitionism never includes the obligatory ethical terms and the ethical judgments or propositions containing them, but confines to the value - ethical terms and the ethical judgments or propositions containing them. At the same time, we will try to show that among the value - ethical terms and the ethical judgments or propositions containing them, only the adjective “Good” and the ethical judgments or propositions containing the predicate “Good” are the objects of Moore's ethical intuitionism.