Contemporary Science and Freedom

Review of Metaphysics 5 (3):361 - 378 (1952)
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Abstract

This attitude was closely connected with the situation of science and philosophy, both of which, a century ago, spoke the language of necessity. Science believed that the facts of nature formed an endless chain of cause and effect, each link of which was determined by the preceding one and in turn infallibly determined the following one, so as to make a rigid system from which no part or element of reality could escape. Science believed that causality in its most rigorous and deterministic sense was the only valid principle that explained natural phenomena; and it measured the success of its work to the extent that it discovered this necessary causal connection. On the other hand, the two great trends of philosophy, positivism and idealism, spoke a similar language: positivism extended causal determinism to the entire scope of reality, and idealism replaced it with a dialectical-rational determinism which was not less necessitating. It is true that these two trends were engaged in bitter controversy, the one speaking of nature or matter, the other of spirit or reason; the one placing mankind, the other infinite Reason, as the ultimate aim and climax of the development of reality. But in spite of their polemics and controversies, the horizon in which both these trends moved was the same: that of necessity. Everything that happens, in nature or in history, must necessarily happen. Every phenomenon, every event, every characteristic or determination of reality is exactly what it should be by virtue of the infinite principle that governs reality itself. This infinite principle was interpreted by positivism in terms of mechanical causality, and by idealism in terms of dialectic rationality; but this diversity of interpretation made no difference on the fundamental point, which was the necessity of reality as such. This necessity meant that any fact or happening, in nature or in history, was fully justified by the mere fact that it was a fact or a happening: at that particular point of the uninterrupted chain of facts, it was the only thing that could and should have happened. Accordingly, each fact or event was an improvement and a progress over the preceding ones, and in turn anticipated a further progress. Progress itself seemed necessary and infallible; and those events which seemingly belied it were actually a promise or a preparation for a greater future progress.

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