This paper proposes a roughly Aristotelian account of powers ontology. In doing so, the paper uses the distinction found in Aristotle between four analogous senses of potency to explain causation and the existence-essence distinction in substances. On this basis, the paper offers some justification in support of the claims that powers and dispositions are the truth-makers of categorical properties and that categorical properties are ontologically dependent upon powers and dispositions.

The arguments in favor of the Principle of Indifference fail to explain its fruitfulness in science. Using the recent metaphysical concept of Grounding, I devise an explanation that can justify a weak version of the principle and discuss an instance of its application in Quantum mechanics.

Physical reality as an explanatory model is an abstraction of the mind. Every perceptual system is a user interface, like the dashboard of an aeroplane or the desktop of a computer. We do not see or otherwise perceive reality but only interface with reality. The user interface concept is a starting point for a critical dialogue with those epistemic theories that present themselves as veridical and take explanatory abstractions as ontological primitives. At the heart of any scientific model are assumptions (...) about which things exist, how they are related, and how we can know them. Scientific models take our knowledge beyond ordinary experience toward explanatory abstractions. The main problem with veridical models lies in why we cannot express our theories and the explanatory abstractions associated with them other than through classical perceptual interface symbols. This study analyses the limits, possibilities and constraints of explanatory abstractions. (shrink)

According to Thomasson’s Easy Ontology, all existential questions have straightforward answers and are solvable by conceptual and empirical work. So there is no need for traditional metaphysics to solve them. First, I give some counterexamples to this thesis from incomplete and undecidable theories. Then I discuss some possible responses, I consider a wider sense of conceptual analysis and argue that even in this sense Easy ontology is not able to resolve the problem and must sacrifice either easiness or answerability. Finally, (...) I will argue that although traditional metaphysics does not make the undecidable sentences answerable, it can still make sense of them and helps us to understand why there are unanswerable questions at all. (shrink)

In recent years there has been a lot of skepticism about the existence of facts. It seems that one of the last places for their application is in truthmaking theory. In this paper I discuss two approaches to the use of facts in truthmaking. The first, categorial, holds that facts are entities that belong to one of three ontological categories (true propositions, truth of propositions, instantiations of universals).The second, deflationary, holds that a fact is merely a functional concept denoting any (...) entity that performs a truthmaking function. I argue that in the face of significant criticism of categorial facts as truthmakers, a defender of facts may resort to the deflationary concept. Nevertheless, even in this case we can do without facts as truthmakers. (shrink)

How does causation in the physical world relate to implication in logic? This article presents implication as fundamentally a relation of inclusion between propositions. Given this, it is argued that an event cannot “causally imply” another, also given the laws of nature. Then, by applying the notion of inclusion to physical objects, a relation “within the possibilities of” is developed, which generates a partial order on sets of entities and is independent of time. Based on this, it is shown that (...) changes of physical objects in time (at any rate, a great many of them) imply, and thus counterfactually depend on, what we call “causes” – an asymmetric dependence which is robust despite the perspectival nature of the concept of “cause”. (shrink)

The article discusses Philip Goff’s latest projects of developing panpsychist research program as one that is capable of revealing the place of consciousness in the physical world and accounting for the intrinsic nature of physical reality, while avoiding the problem of the causal closure of the physical that is supposed to be pernicious for psychophysical dualism. The case is made that on the one hand, dualism has pretty good resources to meet the inductive no-gap objection appealing to the causal closure, (...) while on the other hand, insofar as this objection has some force, panpsychism in the forms discussed in Goff’s book Galileo’s Error (Goff, P. 2019. Galileo’s Error: Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness. New York: Pantheon Books) faces nearly the same difficulties and its capability of overcoming these difficulties is problematic. While the hybrid cosmopsychism, as developed in Goff’s later manuscript, circumvents the causal closure problem, it does so at the price of relying on assumptions that are hardly intelligible. (shrink)

Recently mereological hylomorphism, the theory in which form and matter are considered to be proper parts of objects, has become very important among contemporary metaphysicians. The present work aims to analyse and dismantle Bennett’s criticism regarding the existence of formal proper parts. To do this, I will start by presenting Koslicki’s mereological hylomorphism. Next, I will focus on Bennett’s critique which seeks to deny the existence of formal proper parts. Finally, I will analyse critically the Bennett’s criticism focusing on the (...) scenario of lump of clay and statue. I will show Bennett’s proposal is not explanatorily better than Koslicki’s hylomorphism because she needs to accept a counter-intuitive thesis. Therefore, we should prefer Koslicki’s mereological hylomorphism. (shrink)

Anti-criterialists argue that there are no criteria that ensure personal persistence. However, this perspective is criticized for resulting in an unacceptable consequence that undermines our intuitions, daily beliefs, and direct introspective awareness of personal persistence. I defend anti-criterialism by responding to this objection and arguing that none of these aspects are undermined by anti-criterialism. The flawed objection against anti-criterialism reveals the excessive ambition of criterialism in seeking criteria for personal persistence with metaphysical necessity, which goes beyond our abilities and needs. (...) As beings living in the actual world, we are not able to consider what happens to personal persistence in remote possible worlds. Moreover, to judge whether a person persists or not in daily life, we do not need a criterion that ensures personal persistence in all situations. Anti-criterialism acknowledges the complexity and variability of personal persistence and offers a more realistic and practical approach to understanding personal identity. (shrink)

Causal platonism asserts that mathematical objects cause neural states in human brains. I raise the following four objections to it. (i) Quantum entanglement does not show that one object can causally affect another, although one is nontemporal, nonspatial, and unchanging. (ii) Causal platonism can neither be justified a posteriori nor a priori. (iii) To postulate mathematical media to flesh out mathematical causation is to multiply mysteries beyond necessity. (iv) To say that mathematical causation is unintelligible and inexplicable is not to (...) complain about causation in general. (shrink)