People often get angry when they perceive an injustice that affects others but not themselves. In two studies, we investigated the elicitation of third-party anger by varying moral violation and others’ outcome presented in newspaper articles. We found that anger was highly contingent on the moral violation. Others’ outcome, although relevant for compassion, were not significantly relevant for anger or less relevant for anger than for compassion. This indicates that people can be morally outraged: anger can be elicited by a (...) perceived violation of moral values alone, independent of the harm done. A severe negative consequence for others is not necessary to elicit anger. (shrink)

For appraisal to be a likely cause of automatically elicited emotions, we not only need to account for how appraisals can occur automatically, but also how emotional experience can follow from appraised meaning in an automatic fashion. The simplest way to construe this is to assume that emotional feeling directly reflects the appraised meaning and its implications. Emotional feeling should be distinguished from verbally categorizing and labeling the experience, however, for understanding the relationship between appraisals and emotion terms.

The appraisal theory formulations posited in this special section consider the appraisal process to afford flexibility to emotional responding by the malleability of how people appraise events. I argue that not only the way in which events are appraised but also the way in which appraisals drive changes in other emotion components is characterized by flexibility across persons and context. Accounting for such flexibility is crucial for the further development of appraisal theories and their application to other domains.