Este artículo intenta aproximarse a la figura femenina de Hiparquia de Maronea, identificando su lugar dentro del cinismo antiguo, movimiento filosófico contestatario de finales del siglo iv a. C. Su figura sería ejemplo de una mujer “extradoméstica”, opuesta completamente a la imagen de la mujer ateniense que permanece recluida en el interior de la casa, respetando celosamente las leyes del silencio. Al respecto, para descifrar las claves de Hiparquia, es fundamental y muy significativo considerar el “matrimonio de perros” como la (...) expresión más elevada del éros cínico. La kynogamía implica una ruptura radical con el matrimonio convencional, en cuanto institución religiosa, social y política que determina en el oîkos el lugar de las mujeres en la antigüedad, y constituye el punto culminante de la unión erótica cínica, al poner de manifiesto su “indiferencia” respecto al acto sexual. Hiparquia, comparada con Artemisa, se sitúa en los confines de lo salvaje, unida a su esposo, Crates de Tebas, vive en co-herencia según las leyes de la naturaleza. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 9, Issue 2, pp 177 - 204 This article presents a synoptic account of the faculties of rational soul in the philosophy of Proclus and an interpretation of the unity which this soul constitutes despite the plurality of its faculties and objects of its attentions. It seeks to demonstrate that Proclus, through his conceptual construction of a rational soul grounded in an objective and cosmic framework, accounts for at least some of the subjective aspects of selfhood which (...) many contemporary philosophical theories take to be necessary for a concept of self, but that he does so on his own terms. This means, among other things, that Proclus posits each rational soul as a subjective entity with its own perspective on the world, but a perspective which is always grounded, more or less, in an objective knowledge of the world which belongs to it essentially and eternally. Despite grounding the subjective in the objective, Proclus is able to account for the individuality and uniqueness of souls within the limits of his objective framework. (shrink)

The historian Agathias (Hist. II 30.3-31.4) relates that under the Emperor Justinian seven philosophers (Damascius, Simplicius, Eulamius, Priscianus, Hermeias, Diogenes, and Isidorus) sought refuge in Persia because of their own country's anti-pagan laws but that they ultimately returned in 532 to the Roman Empire. There have been many hypotheses about the fate of these philosophers after their return. Most recently M. Tardieu has argued that these philosophers went to Harran, a town that was located on the Persian frontier and that (...) remained mostly pagan until the tenth century. This hypothesis, which M. Tardieu had backed with a number of arguments, has found many echoes, both positive and negative, in subsequent secondary literature. Yet the complexity of the issue has never really been faced by Tardieu's critics. For example, the fact that, according to Arab sources, Simplicius could found a famous school of mathematics has been completely neglected, as has the fact that details of the dogmas of Manicheanism, which he obtained through his encounter with a member of that sect, enable one to envision a Mesopotamian locale for this encounter. The present study aims at taking stock of the elements of this controversy, beginning with a detailed article by D. Watts and a review by C. Luna. Watts mostly bases his criticisms of M. Tardieu and me on Luna's summary. In the conclusion (pages 58-59), I summarize the main points that seem to me to confirm M. Tardieu's hypothesis. (shrink)