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  1. The illusion of regulatory competence.Slavisa Tasic - 2009 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 21 (4):423-436.
    ABSTRACT The illusion of explanatory depth, which has been identified by cognitive psychologists, may play a prominent role in encouraging regulatory action. This special type of overconfidence would logically lead regulators to believe that they are aware of the relevant causes and consequences of the activities they might regulate, and of the unintended side effects of the regulatory actions they are contemplating. So, as with other cognitive biases, the illusion of explanatory depth is likely to lead to mistakes. And unlike (...)
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  • The Effect of Ownership Structure on Corporate Social Responsibility: Empirical Evidence from Korea. [REVIEW]Won Yong Oh, Young Kyun Chang & Aleksey Martynov - 2011 - Journal of Business Ethics 104 (2):283-297.
    Relatively little research has examined the effects of ownership on the firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR). In addition, most of it has been conducted in the Western context such as the U.S. and Europe. Using a sample of 118 large Korean firms, we hypothesize that different types of shareholders will have distinct motivations toward the firm’s CSR engagement. We break down ownership into different groups of shareholders: institutional, managerial, and foreign ownerships. Results indicate a significant, positive relationship between CSR ratings (...)
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  • Rationality of beliefs and model consistency.Miroslav Misina - 2008 - Economics and Philosophy 24 (1):65-79.
    The assumption of rational expectations (RE) plays two roles in economic models: it imposes restrictions on behaviour of agents, and it ensures model consistency. Dissatisfaction with RE on behavioural grounds has, in a variety of models, led to its replacement by more behaviourally plausible postulates. However, replacing RE by ad hoc behavioural postulates may result in internally inconsistent models. This work introduces a conceptual framework within which the nature of the issue can be described, and points to potential problems that (...)
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  • Physics and Finance: S-Terms and Modern Finance as a Topic for Science Studies.Donald MacKenzie - 2001 - Science, Technology, and Human Values 26 (2):115-144.
    This article argues that modern finance should be an important object of attention. Particularly worthy of study are three demarcations: the changing disciplinary boundary of economics, the distinction between private and public knowledge, and the legal and cultural demarcation between legitimate trading and gambling. The balance between what Barnes calls N-type and S-type terms in finance is different from, for example, that in physics, but that is no criticism of finance theory: the activities of those who disbelieve finance theory’s efficient (...)
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  • Bounded rationality.Till Grüne-Yanoff - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (3):534–563.
    The notion of bounded rationality has recently gained considerable popularity in the behavioural and social sciences. This article surveys the different usages of the term, in particular the way ‘anomalosus’ behavioural phenomena are elicited, how these phenomena are incorporated in model building, and what sort of new theories of behaviour have been developed to account for bounded rationality in choice and in deliberation. It also discusses the normative relevance of bounded rationality, in particular as a justifier of non‐standard reasoning and (...)
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  • Not-So-Minimal Models: Between Isolation and Imagination.Lorenzo Casini - 2014 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 44 (5):646-672.
    What can we learn from “minimal” economic models? I argue that learning from such models is not limited to conceptual explorations—which show how something could be the case—but may extend to explanations of real economic phenomena—which show how something is the case. A model may be minimal qua certain world-linking properties, and yet “not-so-minimal” qua learning, provided it is externally valid. This, in turn, depends on using the right principles for model building and not necessarily “isolating” principles. My argument is (...)
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