This paper examines Hume’s formulations and uses of the conceivability principle and the inconceivability principle. In Hume’s works, we identify different versions of CP and ICP, including proper CP, proper ICP, the weak versions of CP and ICP, the epistemic versions of CP and ICP, and show that Hume not only expresses ICP, but also really maintains it. Assuming an axiomatic characterization of modalities, we argue that if there is a sharp distinction between levels of modalities, then Hume’s conceivability arguments (...) do not hold. But, in a rather different way, we also argue that if Hume’s conceivability arguments hold, then there should be no distinction between levels of modalities. Finally, we argue that after Hume, there are lots of endeavors in logic and philosophy to distinguish different levels of modalities, and to accept new concepts of necessity other than logical necessity. (shrink)

This is the original, longer draft for my entry on Hume in the 'The Routledge Hand- book of Philosophy of Imagination', edited by Amy Kind and published by Routledge in 2016 (see the separate entry). — Please always cite the Routledge version, unless there are passages concerned that did not make it into the Handbook for reasons of length. — -/- This chapter overviews Hume’s thoughts on the nature and the role of imagining, with an almost exclusive focus on the (...) first book of his Treatise of Human Nature. Over the course of this text, Hume draws and discusses three important distinctions among our conscious mental episodes (or what he calls ‘perceptions’): (i) between impressions (including perceptual experiences) and ideas (including recollections, imaginings and occurrent beliefs); (ii) between ideas of the memory and ideas of the imagination; and (iii), among the ideas of the imagination, between ideas of the judgement (i.e. occurrent beliefs) and ideas of the fancy (i.e. imaginings). I discuss each distinction in turn, also in connection to contemporary views on imagining. In addition, I briefly consider Hume’s views on the imagination as a faculty aimed at the production of ideas, as well as on the role that imagining plays in the wider context of our mental lives, notably in the acquisition of modal knowledge and in the comprehension of, and resistance to, stories and opinions that we take to be false or fictional. (shrink)

The dissertation concerns on the theory of perception of David Hume. The problem of perception is the problem about the object of perception. According to Jerome Valberg, the problem of perception is an antinomy. For Hume the problem is a dilemma between two theories, direct realism and representative realism. For direct realism, the object of perception is a mind-indipendent object; for representative realism, the object of perception is a mind-dependent object or an internal one. In the chapter I, I have (...) focused on the positions of Descartes and John Locke. In the chapter II, I have presented the conception of Hume through three different arguments: the argument from illusion, the argument from secondary qualities and the argument from hallucination. Then, I have exposed the Humean objections to the proofs of external world and the theory about belief in an unperceived existence. Hume’s position is the following: the object of perception is an internal object and the representative realism is unverifiable, but not false. It follows, then, that for Hume direct realism is false. In the chapter III, I have compared the theory of Hume with contemporary direct realism, namely, with intentionalism of John Searle and Micheal Huemer, with externalism of Tyler Burge and disjunctivism by Michael Martin. I have argued that Hume’s theory is more consistent than intentionalism of Searle and Huemer and it can’t be objected by externalism and disjunctivism. (shrink)