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  1. Revisionism Gone Awry: Since When Hasn't Hume Been a Sceptic?Adam Andreotta & Michael Levine - 2020 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 18 (2):133-155.
    In this paper, we argue that revisionary theories about the nature and extent of Hume's scepticism are mistaken. We claim that the source of Hume's pervasive scepticism is his empiricism. As earlier readings of Hume's Treatise claim, Hume was a sceptic – and a radical one. Our position faces one enormous problem. How is it possible to square Hume's claims about normative reasoning with his radical scepticism? Despite the fact that Hume thinks that causal reasoning is irrational, he explicitly claims (...)
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  • Hume on Belief and Vindicatory Explanations.Benedict Smith - 2019 - Philosophy 94 (2):313-337.
    Hume's account of belief is understood to be inspired by allegedly incompatible motivations, one descriptive and expressing Hume's naturalism, the other normative and expressing Hume's epistemological aims. This understanding assumes a particular way in which these elements are distinct: an assumption that I dispute. I suggest that the explanatory-naturalistic aspects of Hume's account of belief are not incompatible with the normative-epistemological aspects. Rather, at least for some central cases of belief formation that Hume discusses at length, S's coming to believe (...)
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