Empathizing with others is thought to be a useful, if not necessary, skill for a wise person to possess. Beyond this general conceptual assonance, however, there have been few systematic attempts to conceptualize this relationship. This paper aims to address this issue by investigating what role empathy is said to play in phronesis and whether there is a legitimate place for it in Aristotelian (or neo-Aristotelian) accounts of practical wisdom. First, after a brief overview of Aristotle’s account of phronesis, I (...) will try to define three different ways in which empathy is thought to contribute to it according to the existing literature, based on a conceptual distinction between affective empathy, cognitive empathy, and sympathy. Second, I will ask whether empathy is the best conceptual candidate for Aristotle’s account of phronesis and, more generally, whether the wise person should always rely on empathy in order to deliberate and act well. My tentative answer will be that empathy does not seem to be perfectly compatible with the concept of phronesis, nor is it its best ally. (shrink)