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Is Hume a Realist or an Anti‐Realist?

In Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (ed.), A Companion to Hume. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. pp. 441–456 (2008)

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  1. Phenomenal Powers.Hedda Hassel Mørch - manuscript
    The phenomenal powers view claims that phenomenal properties metaphysically necessitate their effects in virtue of how they feel, and thereby constitute non-Humean causal powers. For example, pain necessitates that subjects who experience it try to avoid it in virtue of feeling bad. I argue for this view based on the inconceivability of certain phenomenal properties necessitating different effects than their actual ones, their ability to predict their effects without induction, and their ability to explain their effects without appeal to laws (...)
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  • La unidad del escepticismo humeano.Plínio Junqueira Smith - 2023 - Ideas Y Valores 72.
    Los intérpretes han dividido la filosofía de Hume, su “lógica”, en dos partes: la destructiva, compuesta por sus análisis filosóficos, su crítica del racionalismo y sus momentos escépticos; la constructiva, que contiene su asociacionismo psicológico, su ciencia empírica de la naturaleza humana y sus momentos naturalistas o realistas. Mi intención es cuestionar cualquier interpretación que suponga esa dicotomía, y mostrar que Hume realiza ambas tareas al mismo tiempo, en etapas sucesivas. Muestro la unidad de su filosofía en tres tópicos: un (...)
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  • Why Hume Cannot Be A Realist.Jani Hakkarainen - 2012 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 10 (2):143-161.
    In this paper, I argue that there is a sceptical argument against the senses advanced by Hume that forms a decisive objection to the Metaphysically Realist interpretations of his philosophy – such as the different naturalist and New Humean readings. Hume presents this argument, apparently starting with the primary/secondary qualities distinction, both in A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 1, Part 4, Section 4 (Of the modern philosophy) (1739) and An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, Section 12 (Of the Academical or (...)
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  • Hume's Scepticism and Realism.Jani Hakkarainen - 2012 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (2):283-309.
    In this article, a novel interpretation of one of the problems of Hume scholarship is defended: his view of Metaphysical Realism or the belief in an external world (that there are ontologically and causally perception-independent, absolutely external and continued, i.e. Real entities). According to this interpretation, Hume's attitude in the domain of philosophy should be distinguished from his view in the domain of everyday life: Hume the philosopher suspends his judgement on Realism, whereas Hume the common man firmly believes in (...)
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