The received view of implicit bias holds that it is associative and unreflective. Recently, the received view has been challenged. Some argue that implicit bias is not predicated on “any” associative process, but it is unreflective. These arguments rely, in part, on debiasing experiments. They proceed as follows. If implicit bias is associative and unreflective, then certain experimental manipulations cannot change implicitly biased behavior. However, these manipulations can change such behavior. So, implicit bias is not associative and unreflective. This paper (...) finds philosophical and empirical problems with that argument. When the problems are solved, the conclusion is not quite right: implicit bias is not necessarily unreflective, but it seems to be associative. Further, the paper shows that even if legitimate non-associative interventions on implicit bias exist, then both the received view and its recent contender would be false. In their stead would be interactionism or minimalism about implicit bias. (shrink)

This review of 122 research reports (184 independent samples, 14,900 subjects) found average r ϭ .274 for prediction of behavioral, judgment, and physiological measures by Implicit Association Test (IAT) measures. Parallel explicit (i.e., self-report) measures, available in 156 of these samples (13,068 subjects), also predicted effectively (average r ϭ .361), but with much greater variability of effect size. Predictive validity of self-report was impaired for socially sensitive topics, for which impression..

I argue that there exists a natural kind social bias that subsumes seemingly heterogenous cases of implicit bias and other forms of social cognition. I explore the implications of this explicated notion of bias for the organization of the mind, theories of consciousness, and the system-dependence of biases.

This contribution provides interdisciplinary analysis of expressions of austerity-policies. It is argued that expressions of austerity-policies are meaningful if and only if intended addressees’ psychological states are adequately attuned and conceptual preconditions for implementation met. Furthermore, it is argued that if addressees are suitably psychologically attuned and preconditions met, utility will, by definition, be maximised and successful economical recovery enjoyed in equal measure among austerity-implementors. The paper is divided into five sections. In the first section the political scene is set (...) in which austerity-policies are expressed and terminology introduced. In the second section expressions of austerity-policies are dissected and analysis of reference conditions of such expressions provided. The third section reviews conceptual analysis of intending and acting together and relates it to jointly implementing austerity-policies. In the fourth section economical rationale behind expressions of austerity-policies is evaluated with reference to what in economical theory is called team-reasoning theory. It is concluded, in section five, that given suitably psychologically attuned implementors of austerity-policies, expressions of austerity-policies are economically rational. But we should be sceptical about their economical motivation: if the people whose actions are meant to implement austerity-policies are distinct from the people whose intentions are meant to be carried out, then it might appear, in the long run, that the former bear a burden for the better of the latter. (shrink)

Note posted 9 Jun 08 : Modifications made today include a new section on predictive validity, and addition of recently published article and in in-press article, both by Nosek & Hansen, under the "CULTURE VS. PERSON" heading, which replaces a previously listed unpublished ms. of theirs. I continue to encourage all interested to send material that they are willing to be included on this page. Please also to let me know about errors, including faulty links.

This theoretical integration of social psychology’s main cognitive and affective constructs was shaped by 3 influences: (a) recent widespread interest in automatic and implicit cognition, (b) development of the Implicit Association Test (IAT; A. G. Greenwald, D. E. McGhee, & J. L. K. Schwartz, 1998), and (c) social psychology’s consistency theories of the 1950s, especially F. Heider’s (1958) balance theory. The balanced identity design is introduced as a method to test correlational predictions of the theory. Data obtained with this method (...) revealed that predicted consistency patterns were strongly apparent in the data for implicit (IAT) measures but not in those for parallel explicit (self-report) measures. Two additional not-yet-tested predictions of the theory are described. (shrink)

Lane, K. A., Banaji, M. R., Nosek, B. A., & Greenwald, A. G. (2007). Understanding and using the Implicit Association Test: IV. What we know (so far) (Pp. 59–102). In B. Wittenbrink & N. S. Schwarz (Eds.). Implicit measures of attitudes: Procedures and controversies . New York: Guilford Press. PDF - 652KB ].