The paper offers a disjunctivist solution to the paradox of tragedy. The first part of the paper defends a version of disjunctivism as that doctrine is understood in the epistemology of perception, and contrasts it with its rival, conjunctivism. In the second part of the paper, it is argued that the traditional paradox of tragedy—the question why tragedy gives pleasure—can be solved by adopting a disjunctivist approach to the relevant felt emotions. The tragic audience does not really feel ‘sorrow, terror, (...) anxiety’ (so Hume), but simulacra thereof, emotions which resemble the originals in certain respects but which have quite different connections with action. A conjunctivist approach to the paradox discerns a ‘highest common factor’ in both non-fictional and fictional scenarios: but this is not only phenomenologically implausible; it decouples the agent from the actions that are essentially keyed to particular emotions, and so splits the self. (shrink)