In this essay, I discuss three readings of Descartes’ Meditations. According to the first reading, “I exist” is for Descartes the foundation of our knowledge. This reading is dismissed on the grounds that, in his view, as long as God’s existence is not proven there is a good reason to doubt this proposition. Proponents of the second reading claim that there are two kinds of Cartesian knowledge: perfect and imperfect knowledge. The meditator has imperfect knowledge of “I exist” before God’s (...) existence is proven. Subsequently, she acquires perfect knowledge of various metaphysical theorems. This reading is repudiated, too. I argue for a third reading, according to which “I think” – and not “I exist” – is the foundation of our knowledge. (shrink)

This dissertation examines Rene Descartes' view of certainty and defends the view that Cartesian certainty is possible. The first half of the dissertation includes an interpretation of Descartes' epistemology as well as an examination of other interpreters' readings. The second half of the dissertation is a defense of the claim that Cartesian certainty of a particular kind is possible; it includes a variety of contemporary objections and replies in defense of the possibility of certainty.

Ever since Arnauld and others first pointed it out in their objections to Descartes' Meditations, philosophers have concerned themselves with what appears to be a vicious circle: that the principle of clarity and distinctness which is employed to validate God's existence is itself in need of a guarantee which only God's existence can provide. In general, contemporary commentators proposing solutions to this problem can be divided into three camps: first, there are those who see reason as autonomous for Descartes and (...) the principle of clarity and distinctness as needing no guarantee. By 'autonomy of reason' I mean that the faculty by which the Cogito and other of Descartes' first principles are perceived is not in need of any verification of its inability to err. Second, there are those who see reason as only partially autonomous for Descartes with that part validating the proof of God's existence which in turn validates that aspect of reason which is not autonomous. Third, there are those who see reason as non-autonomous and who argue for distinctions in the concepts of certainty and doubt in order to avoid the circle. ;In this dissertation I present the problem by drawing directly from the Meditations and the Objections and Replies and I outline the strategy I will employ in dealing with the problem. I proceed to discuss in turn each of the aforementioned three positions, the arguments offered by proponents of each, and the criticism of each, both my own and those found in the literature of the problem. Taking the third position, the non-autonomy of reason, as my starting point, I then present my own interpretation of Descartes' strategy which, I argue, succeeds in circumventing the problem of circular reasoning and in overcoming the objections raised against others. (shrink)

Descartes understood the subject matter of physics (or natural philosophy) to encompass the whole of nature, including living things. It therefore comprised not only nonvital phenomena, including those we would now denominate as physical, chemical, minerological, magnetic, and atmospheric; it also extended to the world of plants and animals, including the human animal (with the exception of those aspects of the human mind that Descartes assigned to solely to thinking substance: pure intellect and will). Descartes wrote extensively on physiology and (...) on the physiology and psychology of the senses. This chapter examines the notions of *physiology* and *psychology* in medical and natural philosophical works of Descartes' day; follows his efforts to bring physiology into his mechanistic idiom; considers the relation between physiology of the animal machine and psychological functions that yield functionally appropriate behavior; goes into his physiology and psychology of vision; and elaborates the tension in Descartes' works between his metaphysically supported micro-corpuscularism and his discussion of the animal machine as an organic unity comprising various functionally and teleologically characterized systems. The chapter draws on Descartes' works in both metaphysics and natural philosophy, including his Treatise on Man (originally published as L'Homme, 1664). (shrink)