Political societies are essentially intergenerational—not only because they often last for many generations and because they maintain their existence largely through members having or adopting children, but because the children of members acquire entitlements simply as a result of being born or adopted by members. Even in a liberal political society, members by birth or adoption are supposed to enjoy from birth the irrevocable status of membership and the privileges it entails. They have opportunities and civil rights that outsiders cannot (...) claim. In liberal welfare states they are entitled to assistance in need. But from a liberal point of view birthright entitlements, and the obligations they entail, are problematic. I will discuss three attempts to justify them. (shrink)

Migrants invariably and unavoidably experience domination under the nation-state centered concepts, categories, and institutions that structure our political thinking. In response, we need to build new forms of citizenship, including local, regional, transnational, and supranational forms of belonging, accompanied by meaningful, democratic, political power. In this paper, I examine historical and present-day alternative models of political organization as possible viable alternatives to state-centric liberal democracy. It begins the task of assessing these models using radical republican theory that grounds non-domination in (...) the active and equal participation of people subject to power.I have three broad aims. First, we need to break down the native-migrant dichotomy to highlight commonalities and search for solidarities among migrants and other marginalized and oppressed groups, including indigenous groups. Second, I seek to awaken the political imagination. Many people do not believe there are viable alternatives to liberal democracy centered around the nation-state. In response, we should draw attention to the ways in which the nation-state’s hegemony is fragile and fragmented and the ways in which sovereignty is complex and contested. Most importantly, we need to consider alternative models for inspiration. Third, we need tools for assessing the desirability of alternatives and for building new forms of citizenship.In what follows, first I explain why the dominant, nation-state centered model of political organization is unable to deliver justice in today’s world, or, indeed, address the collective dangers that humanity faces. I next provide a sketch of a radical republican vision that provides normative guidance our thinking about alternative institutions. I end by using this radical republic vision to reflect on possibilities to guide efforts to remake the world. (shrink)

In this paper I examine the question of what duties the principles of democratic legitimacy prescribe for receiving states towards asylum seekers in general, and towards those who belong to vulnera...

Journal of Political Philosophy, Volume 29, Issue 4, Page 480-495, December 2021.

Some self-declared defenders of democracy maintain that a suspension of the ‘cosmopolitan agenda’ is necessary to blunt the appeal of insurgent right wing populism. I argue that cosmopolitans should support this ‘inward turn’ when doing so helps to preserve the long-term viability of that agenda. Cosmopolitans must certainly motivate citizens of different countries to support it. However, they must also encourage those citizens to support democracy and inclusion at home, for support for the cosmopolitan agenda becomes less likely in its (...) absence. Therefore, cosmopolitans should support the inward turn when doing so makes it harder for right wing populists to erode popular support for democracy, inclusion, and the cosmopolitan agenda. Practically speaking, then, cosmopolitanism should not look that different from liberal nationalism in the short-term. Unlike liberal nationalists, though, cosmopolitans should only prioritize the defense of democracy and inclusion at home for practical reasons – not normative reasons. Accordingly, cosmopolitanism should look different from liberal nationalism in the long run, but not radically so. I engage with the empirical literature on public opinion and pay special attention to Lea Ypi’s argument for ‘statist cosmopolitanism.’. (shrink)

In this paper, I set out to defend the claim that a central principle in democratic theory, the all-subjected principle, applies not only when one is subject to a rule by a state but also when one is subject to a rule by a ‘non-state’ unit. I argue that self-government is the value underlying the all-subjected principle that explains why a subjected individual should be included because she is subjected. Given this, it is unfounded to limit the principle to the (...) state, as subjection which threatens self-government occurs in non-state units such as corporations and families. This means that following the all-subjected principle surprisingly implies that we ought to have family and workplace democracy. (shrink)

“One person, one vote” is wedded to the idea of democracy to such an extent that many would hesitate to refer to a system, which deviated from this, as a democracy. In this paper, I show why this assumption is hard to defend. I do so by pointing to the importance of baseline in justifying a system of “one person, one vote.” The investigation will show that the reasons underlying the most prominent views on democratic inclusion cannot justify “one person, (...) one vote” robustly. This ultimately means that democrats should be less confident in their judgment that 1P1V is a necessary part of democracy. (shrink)

Should artificial intelligences ever be included as co-authors of democratic decisions? According to the conventional view in democratic theory, the answer depends on the relationship between the political unit and the entity that is either affected or subjected to its decisions. The relational conditions for inclusion as stipulated by the all-affected and all-subjected principles determine the spatial extension of democratic inclusion. Thus, AI qualifies for democratic inclusion if and only if AI is either affected or subjected to decisions by the (...) political unit in relevant ways. This paper argues that the conventional view is too simple; that it neglects democratic reasons to recognize only agents and/or moral patients as participants in decision-making. The claim defended is that AAP and ASP implicitly affirm requirements for agency and patiency. In ASP, the entity included must be an agent understood either in terms of legal status, capacity to comply with the law or ability to recognize legitimate authority. In AAP, the entity included must be a patient, understood either in terms of capacity for sentience or consciousness. Thus, the idea here is to explore the potential democratic inclusion of artificial intelligences by an updated account of the relevant conditions of agency and patiency that are implicit in democratic theory. Although conceivable that AI is or will be either affected or subjected in relevant ways to decisions made by political units, it is far less clear that AI will ever be agents or patients in the sense required for democratic inclusion. (shrink)