The Editor begins his Introduction to this volume by suggesting that any scholarly study of Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature that hopes to be taken seriously must confront some formidable obstacles. Expanding his discussion just a bit, I would say that there are at least three. First, thanks to a long tradition of vocal, though often uninformed, anti-Hegelian diatribe, especially in the English-speaking world, on the part of thinkers as diverse as Russell, Popper, and Whitehead, Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature has been (...) summarily dismissed on the simple grounds that he was not only ignorant of even the most basic findings and procedures of the empirical sciences of his day, but claimed to have logically “deduced” certain empirical facts and laws that were demonstrably false. Second, with the notable exception of Whitehead, most twentieth century thinkers, even if not explicitly anti-Hegelian, have tended to regard the traditional philosophical “discipline” of a Philosophy of Nature as a quaint relic of a metaphysically befuddled and happily bygone era, displaced without remainder by the logical and methodological investigations that make up the modern Philosophy of Science. Third, the dominant tradition of sympathetic scholarship on Hegel has played into the hands of the opposing party by all too often offering them a version of Hegel and his immediate predecessors as metaphysical Idealists who must, on principle, rule out of court anything which the empirical sciences might have to contribute to their philosophical projects. All the essays in this collection attempt to challenge one or more of these prejudices, thus collectively making the counter-case that Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature still has much to teach us if read in a sufficiently informed yet open-minded manner. The case is a persuasive one as it stands, although I will later suggest some additional considerations that are largely lacking in this volume. (shrink)