Works by Hiller, Fernando Rudy (exact spelling)

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  1.  14
    Where Does the Knowledge Argument Go Wrong?Fernando Rudy Hiller - 2023 - Análisis Filosófico 43 (1):131-156.
    In his well-known Knowledge Argument (KA) Frank Jackson attempted to show that physicalism is false by offering a case that allegedly showed that a complete physicalist description of the world leaves something crucial out, namely the phenomenal qualities of experience. Eventually Jackson himself retracted and claimed that the interesting task is to explain where and why intuition-pumping arguments against physicalism such as the KA go wrong. This is exactly the task that occupies this paper: to discuss and criticize three of (...)
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  2.  19
    ¿Son la moralidad y la identidad personal productos de la autoconstitución? Dos objeciones a Self-Constitution de Korsgaard.Fernando Rudy Hiller - 2013 - Dianoia 58 (70):191-213.
    En Self-Constitution. Agency, Identity, and Integrity (2009), Christine Korsgaard defiende la conclusión de que el imperativo categórico rige la acción humana porque es el único principio que permite alcanzar la unidad psíquica plena, la cual, según Korsgaard, es un prerrequisito esencial para la acción efectiva. Para los agentes humanos, alcanzar esa unidad -que consiste en hacer coherentes distintos impulsos hacia la acción- es una actividad constante, denominada "autoconstitución". De acuerdo con Korsgaard, ésta es la fuente originaria de la normatividad y (...)
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  3. Testimony and inferential justification.Fernando Rudy Hiller - 2024 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 39 (1):5-22.
    Reductionists about testimony think that testimony is never a basic source of justification. By contrast, anti-reductionists claim that, at least in some paradigmatic cases, testimony is a basic and independent source of justification. In support of their position, anti-reductionists usually claim that paradigmatic testimony-based beliefs are non-inferential in that recipients of testimony usually don’t reason their way from the fact that they were told that p to the belief that p—they simply come to believe that p. In this paper I (...)
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